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Polarized China: The Effect of Media Censorship on People's Ideology
Abstract
Ideological polarization is not a unique product of western politics. A national survey (2007-2014)6
revealed that the overarching division in Chinese society is split between nationalism and cultural
liberalism. Why does polarization happen in society where state ideology dominates the political
apparatuses? This paper approaches this puzzle by examining the relationship between individuals’
media diet facilitated by media censorship policies and their ideology in China. The findings suggest that
polarization as an outcome is caused by nationalists adhering to heavily state-controlled media, while
liberals seek less censored resources. The findings also suggest that polarization as a process is due to
the fact that agnostics who use the media mainly for learning purposes tend to stay or become
nationalists, while agnostics who use media mainly for entertainment purposes tend to become liberals.
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Polarized China:

The Effect of Media Censorship on
People’s Ideology
Gaoming Zhu
Abstract
Ideological polarization is not a unique
product of western politics. A national survey
6
(2007-2014) revealed that the overarching
division in Chinese society is split between
nationalism and cultural liberalism. Why does
polarization happen in society where state
ideology dominates the political apparatuses?
This paper approaches this puzzle by
examining the relationship between
individuals’ media diet facilitated by media
censorship policies and their ideology in China.
The findings suggest that polarization as an
outcome is caused by nationalists adhering to
heavily state-controlled media, while liberals
seek less censored resources. The findings also
suggest that polarization as a process is due to
the fact that agnostics who use the media
mainly for learning purposes tend to stay or
become nationalists, while agnostics who use
media mainly for entertainment purposes tend
to become liberals.
Key words: Political Polarization, China,
ideology, media
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Introduction
Political polarization does not exclusively
exist in western politics characterized by
partisan politics and fundamental disagreement.
7
A national survey (Chinese Political Compass)
conducted from 2007 to 2014 found that
Chinese citizens are also polarized among a
few issues that are ideologically connected.
However, unlike Americans who are
well-known to be polarized between liberalism
and conservatism, Chinese citizens are found
ideologically split between nationalism and
cultural liberalism (Wu, 2014). Nationalism in
China mainly means a “China-as-superpower”
mindset and cultural liberalism is closely
associated with “individual freedom and
individual rights” values. These definitions are
provided by previous research (Wu, 2014; J.Y.
Wu, 2017) and confirmed by this study later
through factor analysis. Notably, ideological
polarization in China is both a state and a
process. That is, not only ideologues are not
Supporting information (SI) is located at
http://angelaxiaowu.com/files/IJoC_supporting_material
.pdf.
7
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willing to listen to each other but the agnostics
in the middle have undergone fast dispersion to
the extreme. Existing theories on this topic
mainly focus on the political polarization in
democratic states, are insufficient to explain the
polarization happening in China, thus this
paper strives to find what factors might
contribute to this ideological polarization
phenomenon in Chinese society and how. Since
it is commonly agreed that the polarization in
China can be traced to the emergence of
unofficial newspapers and media censorship
does not come without cost (C.C.Lee, 1990;
Elejalde et al, 2018; Li, 2016), this paper
hypothesizes that this phenomenon is partially
caused by the dual effects of media censorship
policies.

challenge its political lines or policies.
However, the degree of state censorship varies
based on its relationship with the government
and the nature of the media type, with the
state-owned or state-funded media bearing the
most intensive censorship while giving some
leeway to other media resources. Scholars
found that while the media censorship policies
to some extent strengthen state support, they
simultaneously alienate the “active readers”
who witnessed the information gap reported by
different media sources (Lei, 2011).
Ideological polarization is defined as the
polarization over “a configuration of ideas and
attitudes in which the elements are bound
together by some form of constraint or
functional interdependence” (Converse, 1964).
Prior studies approach the puzzle of ideological
1. Background and Literature Review
polarization mainly through two directions-1.1. Media in China
individuals’ internal biased
The Chinese news media has traditionally
information-processing habits and the external
served as the mouthpiece of the party-state
forces posed by political campaigns or media in
since Maoist era. After Tiananmen Square
shaping individuals’ attitudes. Selective
Incident in 1989, the guidance of public
Exposure a nd Negative Campaigning are the
opinion was singled out as a major concern of most eminent theories respectively. In addition,
the party state. The state officially endorsed the ever since the popularization of internet, many
idea of “taking positive propaganda as the main scholars also consider internet use as a factor
thrust” and avoid too much attention to
that triggers and facilitates ideological
sensitive news (Chan, 2007). Particularly, the
polarization.
state emphasizes the “correctness” of guiding
public opinion and media serves to strengthen 1.2.1 Polarization and Selective Exposure
the legitimacy of the party. To fulfill its goal in
Selective exposure occurs when individuals
“guiding” the public, the state closely controls exhibit bias in their information consumption
the content appeared on media. As a result,
patterns (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet,
Chinese media environment endures very strict 1944). Stroud (2008) found that media users
censorship. Media censorship means that any tend to allocate a disproportionate amount of
popular media in China should not openly
their news diet to attitude-consistent content
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while intending to avoid attitude-discrepant
content. He also provided compelling evidence
suggesting that selective exposure, made worse
by the rise of new media, including cable
television and the internet, contributes to
affective polarization. The media influence
individual opinion though a number of
techniques such as issue-framing,
agenda-setting, constructing reality (Bourdieu,
2001), emphasizing identity (Mills, 1956), etc.
There are at least three reasons that explain
why selective exposure encourages affective
polarization. First, according to Iyengar’s
social identity theory (2012), selective
exposure leads to perceived polarization via
activating partisan identities, which are
characterized by positive evaluations of the
in-group and negative evaluations of the
out-group (Billig & Tajfel, 1973). Second,
according to Bandura’s affective learning
theory (2001),citizens often turn to “elite cues”
for developing and refining their own political
attitudes (Watts, Domke, Shah, & Fan, 1999;
Zaller, 1990). When exposed to partisan news
where out-parties are denigrated and attacked,
people have the tendency to learn and mimic
the negative emotions on display (Jamieson &
Cappella, 2008). Third, attitude rehearsal
theory suggests that the more one thinks about
an attitude object, the more polarized one’s
attitudes become (Tesser & Leone, 1977).

conflict and controversy above all else.
Coverage of advertising has become a staple
feature of news, so much so that the 2004 Swift
Boat ad impugning Senator Kerry’s Vietnam
War record generated more news stories than
the war in Iraq (Geer 2010). Also, suggested by
Iyengar (2012), since individuals typically
categorize themselves into multiple groups, an
important question concerns the hierarchy of
group affiliations. In the case of party
identification, for instance, we might expect
strong partisans to carry more biased
perceptions of their opponents. Therefore,
negative campaigning exacerbates polarization
through heightening the salience of partisan
identity among all other identifiers. Iyengar et
al. (2012) provide compelling evidence
implicating negative campaign advertising.
They pointed out that during the 2004 and 2008
U.S. presidential elections individuals living in
battleground states, who presumably had
extensive exposure to political advertising,
exhibited greater affective polarization and
polarized more rapidly over the election period
than individuals in other states. Most recently,
Lelkes, Iyengar, and Sood (2013) find that after
the debut of the conservative-leaning Fox News
channel in 1996, access to cable television in
the U.S. was associated with higher levels of
affective polarization among Republicans.

1.2.3. Polarization and Internet Use
1.2.1 Polarization and Negative Campaigning
Despite their prominence, these two theories
Candidates routinely spend more time
seem insufficient to explain the polarization
attacking their opponents than promoting
happening in China. After all, there is no party
themselves (Geer 2010). Negative messages are competition in China, and with information
recycled ad infinitum by journalists who seek
censorship Chinese citizens can not submerge
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themselves into news they like. Scholars who
see this then attribute the reasons for
polarization to the popularity of internet.
Given the Chinese state’s firm control in
traditional media, the Internet has been
expected to bring about political and social
change in China since its introduction (Lei,
2011). The internet has facilitated the rise of
online public opinion and promotes a broad
discussion about the contemporary public
sphere in China (Stockmann et al. 2017). As
Tai and Sun (2007) noted that information is
not easily available from the Chinese
mainstream media and the significance of the
Internet is that it allows audiences get rid of
traditional media dependencies and to create
information by being both producers and
disseminators. Studies found that Chinese
netizens users are more politically opinionated
(Le, Y., & Yang, B. 2009). In addition, they are
more likely to be simultaneously supportive of
the norms of democracy and critical about the
party-state and the political conditions in
China. Therefore, those scholars believe that
internet use facilitates polarization in China by
bringing liberal ideas to Chinese society and
enabling liberal conversations.
However, this paper takes the position
internet use theory is not sufficient to explain
the polarization in China either. Scholars tend
to neglect that unlike democratic societies
where structure of the online media
environment much mirrors the off-line division
in politics (Hindman, 2009), in China, the
Internet also bears state censorship, given the
degree of censorship is clearly less than state
official media, leading to relative freer

expression of opinion and freer flow of
information (Zhao, 2010). In addition, with the
popularization of smartphones, people’s
reading habits changed and most state-owned
and fund media went digital. Today, internet is
more of a platform rather than a single factor
that can potentially affect people’s ideology.
However, this paper does agree with the
logistics of the internet use theory, that shying
away from traditional state-controlled media
might help people to construct different
ideology.
2. Hypotheses:
This paper hypothesizes that the current state
of polarization in China, people being polarized
over a few issues, is partially caused by
people’s different media diet when learning
about political knowledge. Due to the
information censorship policies, it is clear that
most state-owned and state-funded media are
saturated with nationalistic values. This media
environment allow nationalists to strengthen
their attitudes but it does not come without
cost. For people who witness the information
gap between different media sources might
suspect the authenticity of tightly state-owned
media and escape to other media sources. Note
to mention, this paper takes the position that it
is people that actively choose media sources
which fit their ideology rather than the content
of media influences people’s ideology. After
all, there are no such “liberal” media sources in
China, only the less censored ones.
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H1: The more nationalistic one is, the more
likely s/he uses tightly state-controlled media to
learn politics.
H2: The more liberal one is, the more likely
one s/he uses loosely state-controlled media to
learn politics.

study is self-administered. The link to the
questionnaire was initially distributed from the
researcher’s personal social media account and
disseminated through friends and relatives to a
larger pool of participants.
3.2. Measurements

Polarization in China is both a state and a
process. Wu ( 2013) found that, the fast
decrease of agnostics, which amounts to the
thinning of the middle position holders,
contributes to overall polarization. So, what
turns those agnostics into ideologues and how?
This paper hypothesizes that the development
of polarization is related to the purpose of
individuals’ use of media. This hypothesis is
based on the findings of Wojcieszak and Mutz
(2009) which suggest that the potential for
deliberation occurs where politics comes up
only incidentally, but is not the central purpose
of the discussion space. That is to suggest that
among agnostics, those who use media mainly
for learning purposes are potential to become
nationalists while those who use media mainly
for entertainment purposes are potential to
become liberals. Drawing on the above reasons,
this paper thus formulates two further
hypotheses.
H3: Nationalists are more likely to use media
for learning purposes than are agnostics.
H4: Liberals are more likely to use media for
entertainment purposes than are agnostics.
3. Method
3.1. Data resources
This study collected its survey data (N=583)
through Qualtrics anonymously in China. The

3.2.1 Ideology- -nationalism versus liberalism
(Independent variable of H1 and H2)
To estimate a participant’s ideology, this
study borrows the statements of the Chinese
Political Compass, a Chinese version of online
political ideological self-assessment. The
Chinese Political Compass consists of dozens
of statements, programmed to return scores of
ideological leanings based on participants’
attitudes toward individual statement. For the
questionnaire, this study borrows 9 statements
regarding nationalism and 9 statements
regarding cultural liberalism. See Appendix for
the full questionnaire.
After factor analysis, I decided to retain only
six of these statements that are most closely
associated within each category as the direct
reflection of individual’s ideology. For
nationalism, the factors include national leader
image, military training, national integrity,
national interests, reunification of Taiwan and
current political system. This paper considers
these 6 factors closely associated with
“China-as-super”mindset which confirms the
definition of nationalism provided by previous
research (Wu 2013). Therefore, this paper only
use participants’ scores on these 6 states to
assimilate their degree of nationalism.
Similarly, this paper only uses another 6

73

statements to assess respondents’ degree of
liberalism and the remained items are believed
all relate to individual rights and individual
freedom, which again confirms previous
studies definition of liberalism. In other words,
in China, nationalism means a
“China-as-superpower” mindset and liberalism
mainly concerns individual freedom and
individual rights. See Table 1 and Table 2.
The degree of a participant’s nationalism is
scored from 0 to 1, with 1 being very
nationalist and 0 being very un-nationalist. The
score of a participant’s degree of nationalism is
based on the average of his or her attitudes on
all of the six statements regarding nationalism.
Similarly, the score of a participant’s degree of
cultural liberalism is based on the average of
his attitudes on all of the six statements
regarding cultural liberalism. The degree of a
participant’s liberalism is scored from 0 to 1,
with 1 being very liberal and 0 being very
un-liberal.Note that this study does not
automatically consider nationalism and
liberalism as natural opposites. Each participant
is given two scores for his degree of
nationalism and liberalism based on different
statement sets. In other words, potentially, a
participant can be both a nationalist and a
liberal.
This study defines nationalists as people
whose scores regarding nationalism is higher
than 0.671 and defines non-nationalists as
people whose score is lower than 0.33.
Similarly, this study defines liberals as people
whose score regarding liberalism is higher than
0.671 and non-liberals as people whose score is
lower than 0,33. The rest of people are those

who do not generate any preference over either
nationalist values or liberals values. The
intersection of moderate in nationalism and
moderate in liberalism is defined as the
“agnostics”. There are in total 127 agnostics
out of the 583 participants. These people are
specifically examined by this research. See
table 4.
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news portals such as Baidu, Sohu etc. have
officially announced their advocacy of party
policies and Fenghuang news, the well known
more progressive news portal was ordered by
8
the government to “self-regulate” . These facts
signal state’s strengthening censorship over big
news portals, thus I classify it as the tightly
state-censored media type. Social media and
overseas media altogether are considered as
loosely state-controlled media due to their
discursive nature. Admittedly, the classification
of media types is not absolute and is based on
this researcher’s own evaluation but its
confirmed through a pretest. See Table 5.

3.2.2. individual’s media diet-- tightly vs.
loosely censored media (dependent variable of
H1 and H2)
This paper classifies media resources based
on the degree of state-censorship one bears.
Studies show that the deeper state-censorship,
the more nationalistic the news resources tend
to be. Based on this standard, this paper
classify news resources in China into four
groups and the degree of censorship decreases
successively --state official media eg: CCTV;
for-profit commercial news portal (eg:Baidu
News); social media eg: (Wechat): overseas
media eg: (New York Times). State official
media receives the most censorship and
become the most nationalist while overseas
media receives almost no censorship and are
the most progressive media resources. For
profit news portal, by the time this research is
conducted, two facts came to mind. Many big

3.2.3. Ideology -- Ideologues vs. Agonistics
(Independent Variable of H3 and H4)
Ideologues are nationalists and liberals and
the classification is the same as mentioned
above. Agnostics are defined as lying of the
intersection of moderates in nationalism and
moderates in liberalism. Those are people who
do not show any consistent preference toward
either liberalism or nationalism. There are 127
agnostics out of the 583 participants.
3.2.4. Purpose of Media Consumption -Entertainment vs Learning (Dependent
variable of H3 and H4)
For the purpose of media consumption, this
paper offers five options -- entertainment,
learning about political knowledge, learning
others’ views, communication, and others. See
the appendix for the full questionnaire. Among
8

See
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/media-censorship
-china
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these options, entertainment or killing time is
coded as entertainment purposes, while
learning about political knowledge, learning
others’ views and communicating with others
are collectively coded as learning purposes.

includes more female and well-educated
participants.

Figure 3: Education N=583
4. Findings
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
583 individuals participated in this survey.
Among those people, 41.9% are male, 58.1%
are female. The national gender ratio is 53.5%
9
male to 46.5% female. It contains a relatively
diverse age span, ranging from 18 to 70. The
majority (66.5%) of the participants have at
least college education. At the national level,
only 9% of the total population has a college
10
degree . See Figure 1-3. Therefore, the dataset
is not representative at the national level, as it
9

It is at birth ratio.

10

This number is reported by last census in 2010.
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In terms of media diet, when asked about “if
you want to learn about a particular political
news or event, which type of media would be
your primary choice?” Overall, about half of
participants claim that they use state-owned
and state-fund media as their primary media
type to learn about politics, while the other half
use less censored media types. It’s unexpected
to see that only about 15% participants use
social media, which is readily accessible to
most Chinese due to the popularization of
smartphones. See Figure 4.
In terms of the assessment of credibility of
different media sources, a large majority
(85.1%) believes that the state official media is
either credible or very credible, collectively
refer to as credibility rate. Surprisingly,
overseas media is considered the next credible
sources (54.7%). The neutrality rate is the
lowest for unofficial news portal. See Figure 6.

In terms of the expectation of media
consumption, most people claim that they use
their declared media to learn about political
knowledge, learn others’ views or
communicate with others, what collectively
refer to as “learning purposes”. On the other
hand, 29.2% of the participants claim that they
use the media mainly to entertain, referred as
“entertainment purposes”. See Figure 5.

In terms of the assessment of neutrality of
difference media sources, still a great majority
considers state official media as very neutral or
relatively neutral sources, collectively refer to
as neutrality rate. The neutrality rate is lowest
for unofficial news portal. See Figure 7.
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The findings confirm that in Chinese society,
pro-nationalism does not directly translate to
liberalism and vice versa. However, it is also
very rare (around 10%) for one to be both a
nationalist and a liberal. In fact, nearly half
(48.9%) of the respondents are nationalist who
remain moderate on liberal statements. See
Figure 8. (eg: M-N & M-L refers to moderate
in nationalism and moderate in liberalism.)
Given liberals and nationalists are not natural
antagonists, the finding also shows that the
more liberal one is, the less likely one become
a nationalist. See Figure 9.

Figure 8: Ideology Distribution N=582

Respondents’ degree of liberalism and
degree of nationalism are measured by different
statements and lie along different dimensions.
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4.2.2. The overall finding confirms H2: the
more liberal one is, the more likely he or she
uses loosely state-controlled media to learn
about politics. Among non-liberals, only 7.1%
of them use loosely state-censored media,
25.9% of moderates use loosely state-censored
media and 37.1% of liberals use loosely
state-censored media. See Figure 11.

4.2. Testing the hypotheses
4.2.1. The overall finding confirms the H1: the
more nationalistic one is, the more likely he or
she uses tightly state-controlled media to learn
about politics. Among non-nationalists, none of
these repondants ever uses tightly state-censor
media to learn about politics, 63% moderates
use tightly state-censor media and 81% of
nationalists use tightly state-controlled media.
See Figure 10.

Note: Phi value: .214; Approximate Significance: 001;
Cramer’s V: .151; Approximate Significance: 001;

4.2.3. The overall finding confirms both H3:
nationalists are more likely to use media for
learning purposes than agnostics and H4:
liberals are more likely to use media for
entertainment purposes than agnostics. Among
liberals, 40.4% of them uses media for
entertainment while 58.5% for learning
purposes. Among agonistics, 35.1% is for
entertainment while 64.5% is for learning
purposes. Among nationalists, only 31.1% is
for entertainment while 68.9% is for learning
purposes. As indicated by Figure 12.

Note: Phi value: .448; Approximate Significance: 000;
Cramer’s V: .317; Approximate Significance: 000;

79

Furthermore, in China, pro-nationalism does
not directly translate to anti-liberalism and vice
versa. However, only about ten percent of the
participants are both liberals and nationalists
based on this paper’s standard (score >0.67).
The number is even smaller if we raise the bar.
That means the extremists are generally
mutually exclusive. A small majority of people
are nationalists with moderates attitudes toward
liberalism.
Given both liberals and nationalist exist in
Chinese society, the numbers are uneven. More
than half of the participants are able to possess
consistent nationalistic values while only about
Note: for H3: Phi value: .315; App Sig: 000; Cramer’s 10 percent are able to possess consistent liberal
V: .223; Approximate Significance: 000; or H4: Phi
values. This finding supports Wu’s (2014)
value: .209; App Sig: 011; Cramer’s V: .148;
study that viewed chronically, it was a smaller
Approximate Significance: 011;
liberal-oriented interpretive community that
arise from the dense mainstream and soon
5. Discussion
become consolidated that construct the liberal
As indicated by Figure 4, given
counterintuitive, nearly half of the participants community in China. Liberals in China are still
use state official media as their primary media considered a minority given their voice is high.
While nationalists in China generally adhere
to learn about politics while less than one third
to nationalistic media, liberals in China,
use loosely regulated media such as
different from those liberals in western
commercial magazines, social media or
countries, are open to nationalistic values to a
overseas media. This finding shows that state
certain extent. However, compared with others,
official media still dominates people’s media
they are clearly more likely to use less censored
diet in learning about politics in China.
As indicated by Figure 7 and Figure 8 , given media type where learning opinions different
the clear ideological affiliation of state-owned from what the state commonly endorses is
possible. The reason might be that the media
and state-fund media, participants still rank
these tightly censored media types as the most censorship policies which help penetrate
credible and neutral media sources with respect nationalistic ideology also alienate people who
to others. This finding suggests that the strategy can witness the information gap from accessing
to less regulated or non-regulated media
of media censorship and the penetration of
sources. Knowing that the state affiliated media
patriotic education worked in China.
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speak for the party rather than for the truth
leads them to seek for “different sources”.
DiMaggio et al. (1996) found that in the U.S.
ideologues use the media to learn politics while
agnostics use it mainly for entertainment
purposes. This finding works differently for
liberals and nationalists in China. In fact, in
China, the more nationalistic one is, the more
likely he or she is using news media for
learning purposes while the more liberal one is,
the more likely he or she is using it for
entertainment purposes. This finding resonates
Wu’s (2014) study that suggests liberalism in
China came from entertainment. The reason
might be that most Chinese grow up in a
nationalistic educational setting and have
strong predilections to uphold nationalistic
values. When they actively use media to learn,
they would hardly encounter any cross-cutting
exchanges. Therefore, the use of media only
strengthens their degree of nationalism.
Meanwhile, when people use the media mainly
for entertainment purpose, they may feel more
comfortable to deliberate those cross-cutting
liberal ideas that spilled over incidentally.
6. Conclusion:
It is unexpected to see the formation of
political polarization happening in an
undemocratic regime where the state controls
ideological apparatuses. This essay posits that
the formation of ideological polarization in
China occurs as a result of different media diet
of people in learning politics. In other words,
nationalists adhere to nationalistic news
resources while liberals adhere to less regulated
media sources. For media type, being less
regulated per se does not mean being

progressive. In fact, there is no “progressive
media” in opposition of nationalistic media
where people can learn liberal values. That’s
the reason why this study concludes that most
theories in western politics do not work for
China’s situation. In other words, this paper
posits that the reason liberals turn to less
regulated sources is due to the side effects of
media censorship policies. It is the dual effects
of the information censorship that contribute to
the current state of polarization. As for the
process of polarization, that is why the
agnostics in the middle constantly shift to the
extreme, this finding confirms that it is due to
different purpose of media consumption. That
resonates Mutz’s study that potential for
deliberation occurs where politics comes up
only incidentally, but is not the central purpose
of the discussion space.
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